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Abstract 
 
Among anxious populations, attention has been demonstrated to be preferentially biased to 
threatening material compared to neutral or other valenced material. Individuals who have high 
levels of trait worry, such as those with generalized anxiety disorder (GAD), may be biased to threat 
but research has produced equivocal findings. This review aimed to systematically review the extant 
experimental literature to establish the current evidence of attentional bias to threat among trait 
worriers compared to healthy controls and other clinical populations. Twenty-nine published articles 
were included in the final review. There was strong evidence of a bias to threat among GAD patients 
compared to other groups and this was found across most experimental paradigms. Few studies had 
investigated this bias in non-clinical trait worriers. Among GAD patients this bias to threat was most 
strongly evidenced when visual threat material was in a verbal-linguistic format (i.e., words) rather 
than when in pictorial form (i.e., images or faces). The bias was also found across several domains of 
negative material, supporting the general nature of worry. Further research should look to examine 
the specific components of the threat bias in GAD, as well as investigating the bias to threat in trait 
worriers.      
 
Keywords: Anxiety; Attention; Generalized Anxiety Disorder; Worry; Experimental   
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Introduction 
The current review examines the extant literature on attentional bias to threatening stimuli 
among individuals with a diagnosis of Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD) or those with high levels 
of trait worry who do not have a diagnosis of GAD. The paper begins by highlighting the distinction 
between “bottom-up” and “top-down” processing before then defining worry itself. The paper also 
provides a discussion of the different mechanisms associated with attentional biases (i.e., 
engagement, disengagement, shifting) and then leads into a brief review of neurobiological evidence 
of threat biases and worry. The paper then discusses Hirsch and Mathews’ (2012) cognitive model of 
pathological worry which focuses on information-processing biases (including attentional bias) and 
the role of attentional control in promoting uncontrollable worry, before reviewing in detail the 
literature on attentional bias to threat. 
This paper is the first known review that systematically examines the empirical evidence of 
attentional bias to threat among individuals with GAD and/or pathological levels of trait worry. 
Although previous papers have examined trait anxiety more broadly, worry has not been specifically 
targeted for review. However, worry is an integral cognitive component of anxiety, which can 
interfere with information-processing directly (Hayes, Hirsch, & Mathews, 2008) and has been linked 
to attentional bias to threat stimuli (Mathews & MacLeod, 2005; Williams, Mathews & Hirsch, 2014). 
It also represents a cardinal feature of GAD, an anxiety disorder with often difficult to treat 
symptoms. Therefore, this review will examine the evidence base for attentional bias to threat in 
individuals with high levels of worry in order to offer important insights into our understanding of 
attentional bias in those suffering from GAD or pathological worry, to highlight directions of future 
research and areas for potential treatment innovation. Given the lack of previous reviews targeting 
this specific characteristic of anxiety, the current paper will aim to focus on the association only 
between worry and attentional bias to threat, rather than trying to identify the specific direction of 
the relationship. Indeed, the role of attentional bias in the development of anxiety is rather complex 
and beyond the remit of this current paper, as Van Bockstaele and colleagues (2014) eloquently 
highlighted that “the relation between attentional bias and fear and anxiety is best described as a 
bidirectional, maintaining, or mutually reinforcing relation.” (page 682).  
Visual attention can be captured by salient or distinctive information in everyday 
environments, such as a smiling face, a growling dog, or a speeding car. At a basic level, selective 
attention can be defined as “any cognitive operation that results in the selection of some 
information over other information” (Weierich, Treat, & Hollingworth, 2008, p. 988). This selection 
can be stimulus-driven, such as changes in perceptual events which may capture attention 
automatically (Franconeri & Simons, 2003), or can be more strategically controlled, such as avoiding 
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certain stimuli in order to regulate emotion (Calvo & Avero, 2005). The former is often regarded as 
being mediated by sub-cortical “bottom-up” pathways designed to rapidly detect salient stimuli in 
the environment (Davis & Whalen, 2001), whilst the latter is believed to be regulated by “top-down” 
pathways located in more prefrontal cortex regions, associated with attentional control, working 
memory, and goal-driven behaviour (Miller & Cohen, 2001). One factor that may influence the 
selection of attention is the level of threat attached to the stimulus, which may bias individuals to 
attend to it over neutrally valenced stimuli in the environment (e.g., MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 
1986). This preferential processing of threat is regarded as being evolutionarily adaptive (to monitor 
danger in the environment) (Ohman, 1986) and is thus applicable to most individuals, but it is more 
pronounced in anxious individuals compared to non-anxious populations (Bar-Haim, Lamy, 
Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & van IJzendoorn, 2007; Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 1985; 
Mathews & MacLeod, 1994). This ‘attentional bias’ to threat among anxious populations is well 
established and may be implicated in the maintenance of anxiety symptoms (Yiend, 2010). However, 
the attentional system comprises several components and is modulated by multiple mechanisms 
and so understanding the distinct processes involved within attentional bias to threat among 
anxious individuals is warranted to inform clinical treatments (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Cisler, Bacon, & 
Williams, 2009; Cisler & Koster, 2010).  
Worry is a feature of most anxiety disorders (Beck & Clark, 1997), but in particular is the core 
criterion of generalized anxiety disorder (GAD; Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 5th Edition, DSM-V; 
American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Worry is often associated with elevated feelings of anxiety, 
but is conceptually distinct, as anxiety is more broadly defined as including feelings of tension and 
autonomic arousal (Borkovec, Robinson, Pruzinsky, & DePree, 1983). Thus high worriers represent a 
subset of anxious individuals, for whom repetitive negative thoughts (typically in quasi-verbal form) 
are particularly prominent. Those with high levels of trait worry may experience negative health 
outcomes, regardless of whether or not they currently qualify for a GAD diagnosis (Brosschot & van 
der Doef, 2006). Consequently, it is important to identify factors that cause and maintain excessive 
worry, with attentional biases providing a possible avenue of research (e.g., Oathes, Siegle, & Ray, 
2011). Although studies have found attentional bias to threat in GAD patients (e.g., Mogg & Bradley, 
2005) and in high trait anxious groups (see Bar-Haim et al., 2007), less research has examined threat 
bias in non-clinical worriers, who represent an at-risk group for the development of GAD.  
Importantly, as will be discussed briefly later, investigations of emotional processing have revealed 
certain neural characteristics that seem to distinguish high worriers from non-worrying high trait 
anxious individuals (e.g. Engels et al., 2007; Paulesu, 2010). 
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Posner (1980) postulated three components of attention: engagement, disengagement, and 
shifting. Engagement refers to the orienting of the attentional resources on a particular stimulus, 
whilst shifting refers to the process of switching from one stimulus to another (Clarke, MacLeod, & 
Guastella, 2013). In order for shifting to occur though, the individual has to first disengage their 
attention from the current attended to stimulus. Clarke and colleagues defined biased engagement 
as “the rapid orientation of attention to a threat stimulus due to its enhanced ability to “capture” or 
“draw” attention” (2013, p. 3), whilst they defined biased disengagement as the “delayed 
withdrawal of attention from a threat stimulus due to its ability to “hold” attention” (2013, p. 3). 
Different methods have been used to assess attentional bias to threat in the anxiety literature, with 
each having advantages and disadvantages. Posner (1980) developed the spatial cueing task, which 
involves participants attending to a cue which is located in the same location as a to-be-identified 
target in the majority of trials and then in the remaining trials the target is in the opposite location 
(opposite to an original fixation cross). This task was modified by Yiend and Mathews (2001) and Fox 
et al. (2001) who used different emotional cues (threat/neutral) to identify preferential processing of 
different emotional stimuli. This task is thought to detect biased engagement and delayed 
disengagement as inferred by speeded reactions to targets in valid trials (emotional cue and target 
in same location) and by delayed reactions to invalid trials (target in opposite location to emotional 
cue), respectively. Fox and colleagues (2001; 2002) and Yiend and Mathews (2001) concluded from 
their use of this paradigm that attentional bias is primarily due to delayed disengagement from 
threat rather than facilitated engagement to threat. However, some believe that the task measures 
disengagement better than engagement (Cisler & Koster, 2010; Clark et al., 2013) and has been 
criticised for not distinguishing between disengagement and a general behavioural slowing that 
occurs in the presence of threat (Mogg, Holmes, Garner, & Bradley, 2008; although see Yiend, 2010 
for a critique of this).  The affective Stroop task (Mathews & MacLeod, 1985) and the attentional 
probe task (MacLeod et al., 1986) have been commonly used, although other paradigms have also 
included the visual search task, which typically involves participants having to decide if a target 
stimulus is present or absent in the presence of distractor stimuli (Müller & Krummenacher, 2006); 
or the attentional blink task, where a stream of stimuli are displayed and respondents are required 
to identify a target presented shortly after the first target has been presented (Raymond, Shapiro, & 
Arnell, 1992). 
The results of studies using these different tasks points to attentional bias to threat among 
anxious individuals in general, but it is unclear whether the bias to threat is a result of facilitated 
engagement, delayed disengagement, or impaired or biased shifting. This uncertainty is due to a lack 
of studies that have specifically distinguished the components of attentional bias (Bar-Haim et al., 
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2007) and the lack of reliability in the methodological designs to confirm the contribution of each 
component on attentional bias (Clarke et al., 2013). Further, research looking at the neural 
mechanisms underpinning attentional bias point to different neural networks and locations involved 
in the bias, as described below. 
The attentional system and the regulation of emotion are regarded as operating through an 
interaction of the amygdala and cortical regions (Bishop, 2007; Blair & Blair, 2012; Cisler & Koster, 
2010), which has also been reported in the context of individual differences in anxiety (Mathews, 
Yiend, & Lawrence, 2004). The initial rapid orienting of attention to threat is regarded as being 
relatively automatic and has been shown to be coordinated by sub-cortical structures, such as the 
amygdala (Davis & Whalen, 2001). However, most of the research cited above has not investigated 
the specific role of worry, as opposed to elevated state or trait anxiety, and current evidence 
indicates that elevated worry is distinguished by involvement of the so-called “extended Amygdala”; 
and specifically, the Base Nucleus of the Stria Terminalis or BNST, which is particularly active under 
conditions of uncertain threat (Paulesu et al, 2010: Yassa et al, 2012).  
Biased engagement of attention with threat cues is often shown at short stimulus exposures 
in most experimental paradigms (Sagliano, Trojano, Amoriello, Migliozzi, & D’Olimpio, 2014) 
suggesting a degree of automaticity in the initial capture of attention by threat cues. When a 
stimulus is exposed for longer durations then it falls within conscious awareness (i.e. is 
‘supraliminal’) and it is generally assumed that at these longer stimulus exposures there are more 
top-down strategic (or controlled) processes contributing towards the allocation of resources (Cisler 
& Koster, 2010). These top-down processes are believed to be governed by frontal brain structures, 
such as the prefrontal cortex (Blair et al., 2012), which are involved in disengaging and selectively 
shifting attention (Miller & Cohen, 2001). As a result, there may be more variation in experimental 
findings when using supraliminal exposures, as individuals may have different attentional goals. For 
example, several studies have found a bias towards threat at later exposure durations and 
concluded that it is due to delayed disengagement from threat, which may be due to an impaired 
ability to disengage attention from threatening material due to poor top-down attentional control 
(Derryberry & Reed, 2002) and/or it may represent an underlying emotion regulation strategy to 
remain focused on threatening information (Wells, 1995). Equally, though, other researchers have 
found biases away from threat among anxious individuals under supraliminal conditions, and have 
inferred that this is due to an attentional avoidance of threat (Mogg & Bradley, 1998), which is also 
governed by top-down processes.  
The relative contribution of bottom-up and top-down pathways to attentional bias to threat 
is still not fully understood. Egloff and Hock (2003) concluded from their assessment of both the 
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affective Stroop and attentional probe tasks that stimulus-driven (bottom-up) biases occurring 
rapidly in the attentional process (short stimulus exposures outside of conscious awareness) are 
distinct from biases that occur when stimuli are presented supraliminally, within conscious 
awareness (where there is opportunity for top-down control). Examination of the research literature 
on neural mechanisms underpinning attentional bias certainly indicates a more complex picture than 
simply top-down versus bottom-up processes, as briefly highlighted below. 
Neural correlates of worry include activation of medial prefrontal and anterior cingulate 
regions as well as the BNST (Paulesu et al., 2010), consistent with the phenomenological pattern of 
thinking reported by high worriers.  Similarly, Bishop (2007) concluded in her review of 
neurocognitive mechanisms of anxiety that amygdala-prefrontal circuitry is likely responsible for 
biases to threat in anxious individuals. However, the exact location and/or pathways are unclear and 
it remains uncertain whether the same pathways are similarly involved in the processing of other 
emotional material (e.g. positive stimuli). For example, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex regions have 
been shown to mediate processing of positive, as well as threatening, material (Herrington et al., 
2005; Bishop, 2007), whereas Miskovic and Schmidt (2010) concluded that variations in attention to 
threat was jointly accounted for by right frontal EEG asymmetry and low cardiac vagal tone. 
Furthermore, Clarke, Browning, Hammond, Notebaert, and MacLeod (2014) demonstrated the role 
of the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in modulating attentional bias to threat. This left-right 
difference between studies  is likely due to the type of stimuli used, since Miskovic and Schmidt 
(2010) used  facial stimuli and Clarke and colleagues (2014) used words,  that presumably require 
more processing in the left-dominated language centres (Zatorre, Meyer, Gjedde, and Evans, 1996). 
This distinction is further supported by Avram, Baltes, Miclea, and Miu’s (2010) study of anxious 
individuals using the Stroop task and EEG data. These authors found attentional bias to threat using 
facial stimuli that corresponded with greater right frontal activation.  
The left versus right hemisphere processing of emotional material was specifically examined 
by Engels and colleagues (2007). These authors also distinguished between anxious apprehensive 
individuals (i.e. worriers) and others characterised more by  high anxious arousal (with 
corresponding low worry) in their processing of threat information, and concluded that biased 
processing of threat words in worriers involved left frontal regions whereas in the latter group, bias 
involved  right inferior temporal regions.  Interestingly, Engels and colleagues (2007) also examined 
the role of left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex regions in processing positive versus negative 
information and concluded that among worriers there are distinct regions responsible for processing 
threat (inferior frontal gyrus) versus positive information (dorsolateral prefrontal cortex).   
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
8 
 
The above evidence of frontal involvement in attentional bias to threat is consistent with 
other findings of impaired control in anxious individuals (for example, when trying to disengage from 
threat).  However, Eldar, Yankelevitch, Lamy, and Bar-Haim’s (2010) ERP data demonstrated higher 
C1 amplitude (at around 80ms stimulus onset asynchrony; SOA) in the anxious versus non-anxious 
group when responding to threat stimuli, suggestive of a biased early engagement with threat. This 
biased engagement is more likely mediated by areas other than just the prefrontal cortex.  However, 
the two processes are probably interlinked and operate alongside each other in contributing to 
threat-related attentional bias.  Indeed, Pessoa (2005) has argued that there is considerable 
interdependence between stimulus-driven attention to threat and top-down control, because 
demonstrating attention to threat actually depends upon the availability of top-down attentional 
resources (i.e. high levels of perceptual load can block the supposedly ‘automatic’ attention to threat 
distracters). 
An alternative form of interaction between bottom-up and top-down processes in 
attentional bias was suggested by Hirsch and Mathews (2012) in their cognitive model of worry. 
Hirsch and Mathews (2012) reviewed evidence that trait worriers have an increased tendency to 
engage with threatening information than non-worriers and also have greater difficulty disengaging 
from it, either due to impaired attentional control ability or a goal-driven focus on threat. Such a 
goal-driven focus could arise from mistaken positive meta-cognitive beliefs about the benefits of 
worrying (Wells, 1995), for example, that worry is helpful in avoiding threats or solving problems.  
Alternatively, the difficulty in disengaging could reflect a reduced ability to redirect attention away 
to neutral or positive topics (Derryberry & Reed, 2002). It is possible that this poor attentional 
control is actually a product of the worry process itself (Hayes, Hirsch, & Mathews, 2008; 
Stefanopoulou, Hirsch, Hayes, Adlam, & Coker, 2014), which takes up attentional control resources 
in high worriers and those with a diagnosis of GAD, thereby reducing the attentional resources 
available to switch to non-worry topics (Klein & Boals, 2001). Leigh and Hirsch (2011) found 
substantially reduced attentional control resources in high worriers when they were worrying in 
their usual quasi-verbal form rather than thinking in the form of mental imagery. Thus the verbal 
nature of worry itself (Hirsch et al., 2012) may be partly responsible for impaired control and to the 
special difficulty experienced when high worriers try to switch focus to other topics. 
It is important to add that attentional bias to threat is just one potential information-
processing bias associated with worry. In addition, it has been previously demonstrated that worry is 
maintained in individuals with a diagnosis of GAD and among high worriers by their interpretation 
bias to threat (Hayes, Hirsch, & Mathews, 2010; Hirsch, Hayes & Mathews, 2009). In fact, this 
interpretation bias is another key component of Hirsch and Mathews’ (2012) cognitive model of 
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worry described above. In their model, they highlight the fact that worriers will interpret ambiguous 
information in a threatening manner and as such the product of this interpretation will be 
threatening in nature and these thoughts will then form a focus for attentional bias. Therefore, 
although attentional bias may be influenced by potential attentional control deficits and/or positive 
beliefs about worrying (see above), it may also simply be that worriers and those with GAD are 
interpreting ambiguous stimuli as threatening more of the time than non-worriers and are 
subsequently directing their focus on this ‘threat’ material (Hirsch & Mathews, 2012). Although 
information-processing biases do not exist in isolation but will interact in important ways (Hirsch, 
Clark & Mathews, 2006), for the purpose of the current review, bias of attention to threat will be the 
point of focus, in order to establish the hypothesised association with worry. 
Attentional biases to threat have been found across a range of anxious populations, both 
clinical and non-clinical and have been implicated in the maintenance of anxiety disorders. 
Importantly, GAD, with its hallmark feature of worry, has been shown to often temporally precede 
other affective disorders and influence the subsequent course and outcomes of these secondary 
conditions (Kessler, Keller, & Wittchen, 2001). Therefore, despite information processing biases 
being suggested to be important across anxiety disorders, it would be helpful to systematically 
review the evidence of attentional bias to threat in individuals with GAD and those with high levels 
of worry (without a diagnosis of GAD), since this may help inform our theoretical understanding of 
worry and GAD, as well as helping to guide future treatment innovation.        
 
Aims and Objectives 
This paper aims to systematically review experimental studies of attentional bias in 
individuals with high levels of trait worry only and as such, it excludes studies that recruited 
participants using measures of trait anxiety more broadly. Further, given that GAD has ‘excessive 
worry’ as a core criterion (American Psychiatric Association, 2013) this review will also include 
studies that have investigated samples of individuals with a diagnosis of GAD. It is widely believed 
that most organisms have evolved preferential processing of threatening versus neutral information 
so as to promote survival (Ohman, 1986). Hence simply identifying a bias favouring threat versus 
neutral information within GAD or high worry (GAD/worry) samples would not add to the current 
knowledge base.  Rather, this review aims to determine if high trait worry samples have an 
exaggerated attentional bias to threat compared to healthy controls and/or other clinical 
populations. This bias will be identified by experimental paradigms rather than through associations 
between reported individual differences, as experimental paradigms provide a more objective 
measure of attentional bias than self-report measures and have established attentional biases in 
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other anxious populations (Bar-Haim et al., 2007). Further aims are to then establish which aspects 
of empirical evidence moderate the GAD/worry attentional bias effect, asking the following specific 
questions: 
 Do adults with GAD/worry (high trait worry) demonstrate increased attentional bias to 
threat compared to healthy controls? 
 Does an attentional bias to threat among GAD/worry groups differ from those seen in other 
clinical groups? 
 Is a similar attentional bias to threat among GAD/worry groups found across all 
experimental paradigms? 
 Does any bias in GAD/worry groups vary at different stimuli exposure times, indicating 
predominantly bottom-up or top-down processing? 
 Is bias in GAD/worry groups found with all types of threat stimuli (verbal-linguistic vs 
imagery; threat vs other emotional content valence; general threat vs specific threat)? 
 
Method 
 
Search Strategy 
The current systematic review conducted literature searches on PsycINFO and Medline in 
week 4 of October 2014, using the following search terms: attention; attentional bias; worry; 
worrie*; generali?ed anxiety disorder; anxiety disorders; anxiety. Mapped terms and auto exploding 
of search results were used where available. The terms were then combined and studies limited to 
studies written in English and studying human samples only. Articles were retained if they fulfilled 
the following criteria outlined below. In addition, the reference lists of all retained articles as well as 
key review articles were searched for any additional articles that could be included in the current 
review. The search was re-run in Week 3 of April 2015 and Week 2 of February 2016 to incorporate 
any relevant newly published papers. Any articles where the decision to include them was uncertain 
were discussed with a second researcher experienced in the field (CH) and an agreement reached 
whether or not to include the article.  
 
Inclusion criteria 
Studies were included if they satisfied all of the following inclusion criteria: 
 Any study published as a peer-reviewed journal article in English, AND; 
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 Any study which has investigated trait worriers (18-65 years old only), as defined by a 
recognised measure of trait worry (Penn State Worry Questionnaire; PSWQ; Meyer, Miller, 
Metzger, & Borkovec, 1990), and/or individuals with GAD (or inferred via the use of a 
recognised measure of GAD) (e.g., GAD-Q; Newman et al., 2002), AND;  
 Any study that has assessed attention to threat/negative stimuli in comparison to 
neutral/other valenced stimuli using an experimental paradigm, such as the affective Stroop 
task or the attentional probe task, AND; 
 The outcome is a proxy measure of attention, such as response time (RT) latencies (as used 
in the attentional probe task). 
  
Exclusion criteria 
Studies were excluded if they fulfilled one of the following exclusion criteria: 
 A GAD/worry group is not specifically identified (e.g., combined with individuals with other 
anxiety disorders within the same sample) 
 Measures used for study inclusion are measures of trait anxiety as opposed to trait worry 
 There is no non-GAD/worry comparison group 
 Attentional bias is not assessed by an experimental task (i.e., if self-report is used only).   
 
Quality Assessment 
Quality of the retrieved articles were assessed using a combination of the Q-Coh I and II 
(Jarde, Losilla, Vives, & Rodrigo, 2013), along with the Effective Public Health Practice Project 
(EPHPP) Quality Assessment Tool for Quantitative Studies (Thomas, Ciliska, Dobbins, & Micucci, 
2004). The Q-Coh II is designed for cohort studies, although assesses quality across domains that are 
relevant for quasi-experimental designs used by the studies identified in the current review. These 
domains include assessment of selection bias (e.g., if studies used standard inclusion criteria), 
information bias (e.g., if studies used validated methods of assessment and outcome), performance 
bias (e.g., if the procedure was appropriate), and attrition bias (e.g., if the study reported or 
accounted for dropouts). The Q-Coh I asks similar questions to its successor, although for the current 
review only the representativeness question was retained (i.e., if the sample has been selected from 
a group that is representative of the population). The EPHPP measure also asks similar questions, 
but specifically for here, only the Statistical Analyses question was used, asking if the statistics and 
conclusions were appropriate. A key factor in assessing quality was the attention to detail of a 
study’s design in controlling for relevant confounding variables, including gender, age, proxy 
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measure of IQ/verbal ability, and depression, with a study deemed to have higher quality for 
controlling for the presence of these variables among their sample. Depression was included as a key 
confounder because research has shown that the presence of comorbid depression can obscure 
attentional bias findings in anxious populations (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; e.g., Mogg, Bradley, Williams, 
& Mathews, 1993). 
 
Results 
The search process can be seen in the PRISM Flowchart in Figure 1. The searches resulted in 
1,933 articles in PsychINFO and 2,471 articles in Medline (Medline search terms differed due to 
different abilities to ‘explode’ search terms between the two search databases). Therefore, the total 
number of articles returned was 4,404, which was reduced to 3,610 after duplicates were removed. 
Titles were then screened for relevance and 303 papers were retained for further inspection. Papers 
were screened using abstracts at this stage and were excluded if they were deemed irrelevant (e.g., 
they were not an experimental study of a GAD/worry population), if they were not published (i.e., a 
dissertation), or were a review paper (n = 242). The remaining articles’ (n = 61) full texts were 
examined and articles were removed for any of the following reasons: a) not experimental or 
measuring attentional bias to threat (n = 16); b) did not have a clearly defined GAD/worry group (n = 
15); c) did not have a comparison group (n = 3); c) any other reason that did not satisfy the 
inclusion/exclusion criteria listed above (n = 3). The remaining articles (n = 24) were then added to 
an additional five papers which were identified from reference list searches of relevant papers (n = 
4) or from an updated database search (n = 1). This left a final number of 29 published articles, 
accounting for 32 separate studies. The studies’ descriptions are in Table 1 and their relevant 
findings are summarised in Table 2. 
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Figure 1. PRISM flowchart of selection of papers. 
 
Participant Characteristics 
The 32 studies accounted for 617 GAD/worry participants, 670 ‘healthy’ controls, 58 speech 
phobia participants, 51 panic disorder participants, 65 non-clinically ‘anxious’ individuals, 36 
‘recovered’ GAD individuals, 50 participants with clinical depression, and 11 participants with 
persecutory delusions. The studies’ group of interest’s (GAD/worry) size ranged from 11 to 42 
participants, with significant findings being reported across the whole range of group sizes. The 
majority of studies recruited participants with a clinical GAD diagnosis (n = 29) as their study group 
of interest, with 21 studies reporting the use of a clinical interview to confirm the diagnosis. Seven 
studies did not report how the diagnosis was made and one study used a self-report online 
diagnostic questionnaire (MacLeod et al., 2007). Clinical interviews were often standardised 
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interviews, including variants of the Structured Clinical Interview for the DSM (SCID; First, Spitzer, 
Gibbon, & Williams, 1995), the Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule (ADIS; DiNardo & Barlow, 
1988), the International Diagnostic Checklists (Hiller, 1997), or the Mini-International 
Neuropsychiatric Interview (MINI; Sheehan et al., 1997). Only three studies used trait worry as the 
group of interest, with one study (Oathes et al., 2011) using a high score on the PSWQ as the 
inclusion criterion for high trait worry, and two studies using a combination of high and low scores 
on the PSWQ and Mood and Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire (MASQ; Watson & Clark, 1991) 
respectively to determine group membership (Engels et al., 2007; Sass et al., 2010). The studies’ cut-
off for ‘high worry’ differed between them, with Oathes et al. (2011) using >55 and Sass et al. (2010) 
using >62 on the PSWQ, for example. 
Twenty-four studies did not report comorbidity among their sample. Of those studies who 
did report comorbidity among their GAD/worry group, additional comorbid diagnoses included 
affective and anxiety disorders. Three studies reported comorbid depression ranging from 45% to 
57% (M = 50%) among the GAD/worry groups. Seven studies reported their GAD/worry group to 
have a comorbid anxiety disorder, including specific phobia, social phobia, OCD, and/or Panic 
Disorder, with comorbid anxiety disorder prevalence in GAD/worry groups being at 27% on average. 
The mean age of participants in GAD/worry groups was 38.67 years (from those studies who 
had stipulated age specific to their GAD/worry group; n = 26) and was 35.38 years in healthy control 
groups (from 25 studies). Three studies did not report gender distribution and two studies only 
reported it for the whole sample rather than within their experimental groups. For those that 
reported gender distribution within their GAD/worry group specifically, on average GAD/worry 
groups comprised 36% male participants, with gender distribution ranging from 0% male 
participants to 64% male participants. On average (from 22 studies that reported it), healthy control 
samples comprised 45% male participants, ranging from 0% to 75% male participants. Only four 
studies provided information about participant ethnicity. In total, GAD/worry participants comprised 
a predominantly ‘White/Caucasian’ ethnic bias (78% ‘White/Caucasian’), whilst healthy control 
comparisons comprised 81% ‘White/Caucasian’. One study only reported ethnicity for the whole 
sample, with 81% of their sample being ‘European American’ (Sass et al., 2010). 
 
Table 1: Systematic Review Study Characteristics 
Study Sample M:F Ratio Age Range 
Mean (SD) 
Ethnicity Comorbidity 
Albu, 2008 
 
GAD Dx (n = 20) 
vs HC (n = 20) 
GAD = 
6:14; HC = 
12:8) 
GAD = 49.45; 
HC = 45.15 
Not reported Not reported 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
15 
 
Study Sample M:F Ratio Age Range 
Mean (SD) 
Ethnicity Comorbidity 
Ashwin et 
al., 2012 
GAD Dx (n = 18) 
vs PD Dx (n = 
17) vs HC (n = 
31) 
GAD = 
5:13; PD = 
2:15; HC = 
12:19 
GAD = 32.06 
(10.2); PD = 
32.76 (9.22); 
HC = 29.26 
(9.20) 
Not reported Not reported 
Becker et al., 
2001 
 
GAD Dx (n = 32) 
vs Speech Phob 
Dx (n = 29) vs 
HC (n = 31) 
GAD = 
56.6% 
male; 
Speech 
Phob = 
60% 
male; HC 
= 56.7% 
male 
GAD = 44.3; 
Speech Phob 
= 46.2; HC = 
45.2 
GAD = 71% 
White, 12.9% 
Asian, 12.9% 
Hispanic; 
Speech Phob = 
90% White, 
6.7% Hispanic, 
3.3% Asian; 
HC = 78.1% 
White, 9.4% 
Black, 6.3% 
Hispanic, 3.1% 
American 
Indian, 3.1% 
Asian 
GAD: Specific 
Phob n = 4; 
Speech Phob: 
Specific Phob 
n = 8, PD n = 
1; HC: 
Specific Phob 
n = 3 
Blair et al., 
2012 
GAD Dx (n = 17) 
vs HC (n = 18) 
GAD = 
4:13; HC = 
8:10 
GAD = 34.9 
(10.93); HC = 
30.4 (6.86) 
Not reported “No other 
Axis I 
Disorders” 
Bradley et 
al., 1995 
GAD (ADIS-R; n 
= 20) (GAD only 
n = 11; 
GAD+Dep n = 9) 
vs HC (n = 20) 
GAD only 
= 7:4; 
GAD+Dep 
= 5:4; HC 
= not 
reported 
18-55 years Not reported GAD = 2 PD, 1 
Social Phob; 
GAD+Dep = 1 
PD, 1 Social 
Phob 
Bradley et 
al., 1999 
GAD Dx (n = 14) 
vs HC (n = 33) 
GAD = 
7:7; HC = 
13:20 
GAD = 36.4 
(9.6); HC = 
31 (11.6) 
Not reported GAD: Dep (n 
= 8; including 
1 with PD and 
1 with Social 
Phob); Social 
Phob (n = 3; 
including 1 
with PD and 1 
with Specific 
Phob) 
Chen et al., 
2013 
GAD Dx (n = 42) 
vs PD Dx (n = 
34) vs HC (n = 
46) 
GAD = 
19:23; PD 
= 11:23; 
HC = 
15:31 
GAD = 34.33 
(7.98); PD = 
31.59 (8.58); 
HC = 31.07 
(7.51) 
Not reported Not reported 
Dibartolo et 
al., 1997 
GAD Dx with 
PSWQ >57 (n = 
15) vs HC with 
PSWQ <46 (n = 
20% male 36.13 (12.88) Not reported Not reported 
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Study Sample M:F Ratio Age Range 
Mean (SD) 
Ethnicity Comorbidity 
15) 
Engels et al., 
2007 
Anxious 
Apprehension 
(Worry) (>80th 
percentile on 
PSWQ AND 
<50th percentile 
on MASQ; n = 
11) vs Anxious 
Arousal (>80th 
percentile on 
MASQ AND 
<50th percentile 
on PSWQ; n = 
13) vs Low Anx 
(<50th 
percentile on 
both PSWQ and 
MASQ; n = 18) 
Total = 
18:24 
18.71 (0.80) Not reported All 
participants 
scored <50th 
percentile on 
depressed 
mood scale 
(MASQ-AD) 
Freeman et 
al., 2000 
GAD Dx (n = 12) 
vs Pers 
Delusions group 
(as assessed by 
SCAN-v10; n = 
11) vs HC with 
STAI-T <44 (n = 
12) 
GAD = 
6:6; Pers 
Delusions 
= 8:3; HC 
= 9:3 
GAD = 43 
(10.6); Pers = 
38.9 (12.7); 
HC = 40.8 
(9.2) 
Not reported GAD: 6 
secondary 
dep, 6 with 
additional 
anx disorder; 
Pers 
Delusions: 10 
paranoid 
schizophrenia
, 1 delusional 
disorder 
MacLeod & 
Mathews, 
1991 
GAD Dx (n = 16) 
vs HC (n = 16) 
GAD = 
4:12; HC 
ratio not 
given 
GAD = 36.4 
(11.04); HC = 
36.1 (10.1) 
Not reported Not reported 
MacLeod et 
al., 2007 
Self-reported 
GAD Dx (n = 24) 
vs HC (n = 35) 
Not 
reported 
Not reported Not reported Not reported 
MacNamara 
& Hajcak, 
2010 
GAD Dx (n = 15) 
vs HC (n = 15) 
GAD = 
2:13; HC = 
4:11 
GAD = 33.53 
(14.74); HC = 
31.73 (11.20) 
Not reported GAD: Specific 
Phob (n = 2) 
Martin et al., 
1991; Exp 2 
GAD Dx (n = 12) 
vs Anx Controls 
(n = 12) 
GAD = 
3:9; Anx 
Control = 
0:12 
GAD = 36.3; 
Anx Control 
= 28.4 
Not reported Not reported 
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Study Sample M:F Ratio Age Range 
Mean (SD) 
Ethnicity Comorbidity 
Martin et al., 
1991; Exp 4 
GAD Dx (n = 12) 
vs HC (n = 12) 
GAD = 4:8 
HC not 
given 
Mean for 
both = 37.6 
Not reported Not reported 
Mathews & 
MacLeod, 
1985 
GAD Patient (no 
information 
reported) (n = 
24) vs HC (n = 
24) 
GAD = 
12:12; HC 
= 12:12 
GAD = 33.3; 
HC = 31.7 
Not reported Not reported 
Mathews et 
al., 1990; 
Task 2 
GAD Dx (n = 18) 
vs Recovered 
GAD (no Dx for 
at least 6 
months; n = 18) 
vs HC (n = 18) 
GAD = 
6:12; 
Recovere
d = 9:9; 
HC = 8:10 
GAD = 37.2 
(11.7); 
Recovered = 
40 (9.7); HC 
= 35 (11.3) 
Not reported Not reported 
Mathews et 
al., 1995 
GAD Dx (n = 24) 
vs HC (n = 23) 
GAD = 
8:16; HC = 
8:15 
GAD = 34.6; 
HC = 37.5 
Not reported Not reported 
Mogg et al., 
1989 
GAD Patient (no 
information 
reported) (n = 
18) vs HC (n = 
18) 
GAD = 
2:16; HC = 
5:13 
GAD = 43.3 
(27-63 
years); HC = 
36.5 (20-60 
years) 
Not reported Not reported 
Mogg et al., 
1991 
GAD Dx (n = 12) 
vs HC (n = 12) 
GAD = 
6:6; HC = 
3:9 
GAD = 37.8; 
HC = 35.8 
Not reported Not reported 
Mogg et al., 
1992 
GAD Dx (n = 18) 
vs Recovered 
GAD (no dx for 
at least 6 
months; n = 18) 
vs HC (n = 18) 
GAD = 
6:12; 
Recovere
d = 9:9; 
HC = 8:10 
GAD = 37.2; 
Recovered = 
40; HC = 35 
Not reported Not reported 
Mogg et al., 
1993 
GAD Dx (Intvw; 
no dep) & >10 
on HADS-A (n = 
19) vs Dep Dx & 
>12 HADS-D (n = 
18) vs HC 
(HADS-A <11, 
HADS-D <13; n = 
18) 
GAD = 
5:14; Dep 
= 4:14; HC 
= 8:10 
GAD = 38.2; 
Dep = 34.8; 
HC = 39.1 
Not reported Not reported 
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Study Sample M:F Ratio Age Range 
Mean (SD) 
Ethnicity Comorbidity 
Mogg et al., 
1995 
GAD Dx (with no 
Dep) AND >10 
on HADS-A (n = 
17) vs Dep Dx 
only (n = 17) vs 
HC with HADS 
<cut-offs (Anx 
and Dep) in 
study (n = 15) 
GAD = 
5:12; HC = 
5:10; Dep 
= 5:12 
GAD = 39.6; 
HC = 40.3; 
Dep = 34.5 
Not reported Not reported 
Mogg et al., 
1995b 
GAD Dx 
(without Dep; n 
= 11) vs HC (n = 
17) 
GAD = 
7:4; HC = 
7:8 
GAD = 37.8; 
HC = 32 
Not reported GAD: PD = 2; 
Social Phob = 
1 
Mogg et al., 
2000 
GAD Dx 
(without Dep) 
and >10 on 
HADS-A (n = 14) 
vs Dep Dx and 
>15 on BDI (n = 
15) vs HC with 
<8 on HADS-A 
and <10 on BDI 
(n = 16) 
GAD = 
5:9; Dep = 
3:12; HC = 
9:7 
GAD = 41.5 
(16); Dep = 
40.8 (12); HC 
= 36.7 (8.8) 
Not reported GAD: Social 
Phob = 1, PD 
= 3, Social 
Phob with PD 
= 1; Dep: 
GAD = 13, PD 
= 7, 
Agoraphobia 
= 5, Social 
Phob = 3, 
OCD = 1 
Oathes et al., 
2011 
High Worry 
(PSWQ >55; n = 
17) vs Low 
Worry (PSWQ 
<56; n = 11) 
Worry = 
4:13; Low 
worry = 
5:6 
Worry = 18.2 
(0.42; 18-
19); Low 
worry = 
19.06 (1.00; 
18-21) 
High Worry = 
13 White, 1 
Asian, 1 
Hispanic, 1 
African 
American, 1 
non-
responded; 
HC = 10 
White, 1 
Hispanic 
Not reported 
Olatunji et 
al., 2011 
GAD Dx (n = 30) 
vs HC (n = 30) 
GAD = 
15:15; HC 
= 15:15 
GAD = 38.63 
(11.26); HC = 
39.50 (10.29) 
GAD = 86.7% 
'Caucasian'; 
HC = 73.3% 
'Caucasian' 
Not reported 
Rinck et al., 
2003; Exp 1 
GAD Dx (n = 32) 
vs Speech Phob 
Dx (n = 29) vs 
HC (n = 31) 
GAD = 
56.6% 
male; 
Speech 
Phob = 
60% 
male; HC 
= 56.7% 
male 
GAD = 44.3 
(9.8); Speech 
Phob = 46.2 
(11.5); HC = 
45.2 (12.1) 
Not reported Not reported 
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Study Sample M:F Ratio Age Range 
Mean (SD) 
Ethnicity Comorbidity 
Rinck et al., 
2003; Exp 2 
GAD Dx (n = 26) 
vs HC (n = 26) 
GAD = 
0:26; HC = 
0:26 
GAD = 23.3 
(5.3); HC = 
22.6 (5.1) 
Not reported HC were 
allowed mild 
specific phob, 
but not 
specified 
Sass et al., 
2010 
Anxious 
Apprehension 
(Worry) (>62 on 
PSWQ AND 
<50th percentile 
on MASQ; n = 
21) vs Anxious 
Arousal (>32 on 
MASQ AND 
<50th percentile 
on PSWQ; n = 
26) vs Low Anx 
(<50th 
percentile on 
both PSWQ and 
MASQ; n = 36) 
Worry = 
5:16; Anx 
= 12:14; 
Low Anx = 
20:16 
Total Sample 
= 18.86 
(0.87) 
Total Sample 
= 81% 
European 
American; 
13% 
Asian/Pacific 
Islander; 5% 
African 
American; 1% 
Hispanic 
Not reported 
Yiend et al., 
2014; Exp 1 
GAD Dx (SCID; n 
= 14) vs Anx 
(>45 STAI-T; n = 
14) vs HC (n = 
14) 
Not 
reported 
GAD = 43.1 
(7.1); Anx = 
32.8 (8.6); 
HC = 45 (8.6) 
Not reported Not reported 
Yiend et al., 
2014; Exp 2 
GAD Dx (SCID; n 
= 21) vs HC (n = 
21) 
Not 
reported 
GAD = 40.48; 
HC = 38.62 
Not reported Not reported 
Note. M:F = Male:Female; GAD = Generalized Anxiety Disorder; Dx = diagnosis; HC = Healthy 
Controls; PD = Panic Disorder; Phob = Phobia; ADIS-R = Anxiety Disorder Interview Schedule – 
Revised; Dep = Depression; PSWQ = Penn State Worry Questionnaire; Pers = Persecutory; Anx = 
Anxiety; SCAN-v10 = Schedules for Clinical Assessment in Neuropsychiatry – Version 10; STAI-T = 
State Trait Anxiety Inventory – Trait Scale; Exp = Experiment; Intvw = Clinical Interview; HADS-A = 
Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale – Anxiety; HADS-D = Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale – 
Depression; BDI = Beck Depression Inventory; OCD = Obsessive Compulsive Disorder; SCID = 
Structured Clinical Interview for DSM Disorders; MASQ = Mood and Anxiety Symptom 
Questionnaire; MASQ-AD = Mood and Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire – Anhedonic Depression.  
 
Study Designs 
Fifteen studies used a form of the affective Stroop Task, 11 studies used a form of the 
attentional probe task, five used a visual search paradigm, one study used an attentional blink 
paradigm and two studies used variants of the spatial cueing task. All studies used visual stimuli in 
the paradigms, although the type of visual stimuli used in the studies varied somewhat. The stimuli 
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valence also varied with studies comparing threat material with either one or more differently-
valenced material. Ten studies compared threat/negative/anxiety/GAD-related stimuli with neutral 
stimuli only (Albu, 2008; Dibartolo et al., 1997; MacLeod & Mathews, 1991; MacLeod et al., 2007; 
MacNamara & Hajcak, 2010; Martin et al., 1991, experiment 2; Mathews & MacLeod, 1985; Mogg et 
al., 1992; Mogg et al., 1991, 1989); and eighteen studies compared threat with positive stimuli 
(Ashwin et al., 2012; Becker et al., 2001; Blair et al., 2012; Bradley et al., 1999; Chen et al., 2013; 
Engels et al., 2007; Freeman et al., 2000; Martin et al., 1991, experiment 4; Mathews et al., 1990, 
task 2; 1995; Mogg et al., 1995; Mogg et al., 1993, 2000; Oathes et al., 2011; Rinck et al., 2003, 
experiment 2; Sass et al., 2010; Yiend et al., 2014, experiment 1). Several studies examined the 
specificity of the bias to threat by comparing threat/GAD-related stimuli with sad/depression stimuli 
(n = 5; Bradley et al., 1995; Mogg, Bradley, Millar, et al., 1995b; Mogg et al., 1993, 2000; Mogg, 
Bradley, & Williams, 1995), anxiety disorder specific stimuli (speech phobia, Becker et al., 2001; 
Rinck et al., 2003, experiment 1); (panic disorder, Chen et al., 2013), or other stimuli related to 
disgust or eroticism (Olatunji et al., 2011), or by comparing physical threat with social threat stimuli 
(Martin et al., 1991, experiment 2, experiment 4; Mathews & MacLeod, 1985; Mathews et al., 1990, 
task 2, 1995; Mogg et al., 1992, 1989) or by comparing potential threat with direct threat and hidden 
threat (Freeman et al., 2000). 
There was a variety of exposure times used among the sample of papers, as can be seen in 
Table 2. Four studies included masked stimuli to ensure they were presented outside of conscious 
awareness (Bradley et al., 1995; Mogg, Bradley, Millar, et al., 1995b; Mogg et al., 1993; Mogg, 
Bradley, & Williams, 1995), whilst 16 studies had designs where the stimuli were presented until the 
participant made a response, or where stimulus duration was present throughout the task (e.g., 
colour-naming words presented on a card for the affective Stroop task). 
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Table 2: Systematic Review Summary of Attentional Bias Findings 
Study G 
or 
W?  
G/
W 
grp 
size 
Task Stimuli SOA 
(ms) 
G/W 
bias 
vs 
HC? 
G/W bias 
vs other 
grp (name 
of grp)? 
Outcome Additional 
Attentional 
Bias 
Biological 
Findings 
Albu 2008 G 20 Stroop Words n/a Y ~ Reading 
Time 
~ 
Ashwin et al 
2012 
G 18 Visl. 
Search 
Faces 300 Y Y (Panic) Mean RT ~ 
Becker et al 
2001 
G 32 Stroop Words n/a Y Y (Sp Phob) Reading 
Time 
~ 
Blair et al 
2012 
G 17 Stroop Images 400 N ~ Mean RT MPFC: GAD 
= HC; 
Amygdala: 
GAD < HC 
& SocP 
Bradley et al 
1995 
G 20 Stroop Words 14 & 
u/r 
Y ~ Mean RT ~ 
Bradley et al 
1995 
G 11 Stroop Words 14 & 
u/r 
Y Y 
(GAD+Dep) 
Mean RT ~ 
Bradley et al 
1999 
G 14 Attenti
onal 
probe 
Faces 500 & 
1250 
Y ~ Mean RT ~ 
Chen et al 
2013 
G 42 Stroop Words 1000 Y N (Panic) Mean RT ~ 
Dibartolo et 
al 1997 
G 15 Attenti
onal 
probe 
Words 2000 N ~ Mean RT ~ 
Engels et al 
2007 
W 1 Stroop Words 1500 N N Mean RT Increased 
activation 
of ITG and 
hypoactivat
ion in rACC 
in worriers 
v HC; 
worriers 
recorded 
more 
activation 
in left 
hemispher
e IFG and 
ITG v 
anxious 
arousals 
(whom 
exhibited 
more right 
hemispher
e 
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Study G 
or 
W?  
G/
W 
grp 
size 
Task Stimuli SOA 
(ms) 
G/W 
bias 
vs 
HC? 
G/W bias 
vs other 
grp (name 
of grp)? 
Outcome Additional 
Attentional 
Bias 
Biological 
Findings 
activation); 
DLPFC used 
to direct 
attention 
away from 
positive 
words 
different to 
Broca’s 
area used 
during 
periods of 
worry. 
Freeman et 
al 2000 
G 12 Visl. 
Search 
Images 10000 N N (Pers 
Delusions) 
Eye 
Movement 
~ 
MacLeod & 
Mathews 
1991 
G 16 Attenti
onal 
probe 
Words u/r Y ~ Mean RT ~ 
MacLeod et 
al 2007; 
Study 1 
(G) 24 Attenti
onal 
probe 
Words 500 Y ~ Median RT ~ 
MacNamara 
& Hajcak 
2010 
G 15 Attenti
onal 
probe 
Images 250 N ~ Mean RT Larger LPP 
for aversive 
targets 
compared 
to neutral 
ones for all 
grps; LPP 
for aversive 
targets 
(compared 
to neutral) 
was bigger 
in GAD 
than HC 
when 
distractors 
were 
neutral. 
Martin et al 
1991; Exp 2 
G 12 Stroop Words n/a ~ Y (Trait 
Anx) 
Reading 
Time 
~ 
Martin et al 
1991; Exp 4 
G 12 Stroop Words n/a Y ~ Reading 
Time 
~ 
Mathews & 
MacLeod 
1985 
G 24 Stroop Words n/a Y ~ Reading 
Time 
~ 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
23 
 
Study G 
or 
W?  
G/
W 
grp 
size 
Task Stimuli SOA 
(ms) 
G/W 
bias 
vs 
HC? 
G/W bias 
vs other 
grp (name 
of grp)? 
Outcome Additional 
Attentional 
Bias 
Biological 
Findings 
Mathews et 
al 1990; Task 
2 
G 18 Attenti
onal 
probe 
Words u/r Y N 
(Recovered 
GAD) 
Mean RT ~ 
Mathews et 
al 1995 
G 24 Attenti
onal 
probe 
Words u/r Y ~ Mean RT ~ 
Mathews et 
al 1995 
G 24 Stroop Words n/a Y ~ Reading 
Time 
~ 
Mogg et al 
1989 
G 18 Stroop Words n/a Y ~ Reading 
Time 
~ 
Mogg et al 
1991 
G 12 Attenti
onal 
probe 
Words u/r Y ~ Mean RT ~ 
Mogg et al 
1992 
G 18 Attenti
onal 
probe 
Words 500 Y N 
(Recovered 
GAD) 
Mean RT ~ 
Mogg et al 
1993 
G 19 Stroop Words 14 & 
u/r 
Y Y (Dep) Mean RT ~ 
Mogg et al 
1995 
G 17 Attenti
onal 
probe 
Words 14 & 
1000 
Y ~ Mean RT ~ 
Mogg et al 
1995 
G 17 Attenti
onal 
probe 
Words 14 & 
1000 
~ N (Dep) Mean RT ~ 
Mogg et al 
1995b 
G 11 Stroop Words 14 & 
u/r 
Y ~ Mean RT ~ 
Mogg et al 
2000 
G 14 Attenti
onal 
probe 
Faces 1000 N N (Dep) Mean RT ~ 
Mogg et al 
2000 
G 14 Attenti
onal 
probe 
Faces 1000 Y Y (Dep) Eye 
Movement 
~ 
Oathes et al 
2011 
W 17 Stroop Images 6000 N ~ Mean RT Worriers 
had 
reduced 
pupil 
dilation v 
HC on 
incongruen
t stroop 
trials; for 
negative 
personally-
relevant 
words: low 
worriers 
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Study G 
or 
W?  
G/
W 
grp 
size 
Task Stimuli SOA 
(ms) 
G/W 
bias 
vs 
HC? 
G/W bias 
vs other 
grp (name 
of grp)? 
Outcome Additional 
Attentional 
Bias 
Biological 
Findings 
had greater 
sustained 
pupil 
reactivity v 
worriers; 
there were 
no grp diffs 
specific to 
threat 
words 
Oathes et al 
2011 
W 17 Stroop Words 6000 Y ~ Mean RT  
Olatunji et al 
2011 
G 30 Attl. 
Blink 
Images 100 N ~ Response 
Accuracy 
~ 
Rinck et al 
2003; Exp 1 
G 32 Visl. 
Search 
Words u/r Y Y (Sp Phob) Mean RT ~ 
Rinck et al 
2003; Exp 2 
G 26 Visl. 
Search 
Words u/r Y ~ Mean RT ~ 
Sass et al 
2010 
W 21 Stroop Words 1500 N ~ Mean RT Worriers 
prioritised 
processing 
of 
emotional 
words; 
anxious 
arousals 
process 
even 
earlier; no 
grp diffs at 
later 
(>300ms) 
processing 
Yiend et al 
2014; Exp 1 
G 14 Sptl 
Cueing 
Faces u/r Y N (Trait 
Anx) 
Mean RT ~ 
Yiend et al 
2014; Exp 2 
G 21 Sptl 
Cueing 
Faces 200 & 
500 
N ~ Mean RT ~ 
Yiend et al 
2014; Exp 2 
G 21 Sptl 
Cueing 
Faces 300 & 
700 
N ~ Mean RT  
Note. Some studies have more than one row where analyses were conducted separately or where 
different findings were reported for separate comparisons; GAD = Generalized Anxiety Disorder; G = 
GAD; W = High Worry; Grp = Group; SOA = Stimulus Onset Asynchrony; ms = milliseconds; HC = 
Healthy Controls; n/a = not applicable; ~ = not assessed; Visl = Visual; Y = Yes; N = No; RT = Reaction 
Time; Sp Phob = Speech Phobia; SocP = Social Phobia; u/r = until response; Dep = Depression; Anx = 
Anxiety; Pers = Persecutory; Sptl = Spatial; MPFC = medial prefrontal cortex; IFG = inferior frontal 
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gyrus; ITG = inferior temporal gyrus; DLPFC = dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; rACC = rostral anterior 
cingulate cortex; LPP = late positive potential.  
 
Overall Study Findings 
Do adults with GAD/high worry attend more to threat compared to healthy controls? 
Attentional bias to threat among adults with GAD/worry compared to healthy controls was 
found in 22 out of 32 studies (69%). All these studies supported the hypothesis that GAD/worry 
participants attend more to threat than healthy controls, with all but one of them using speed of 
responding (e.g., reaction time, reading time, or eye movement data) as the primary outcome 
variable. When accuracy was used as an outcome variable (n = 15 studies), only MacNamara & 
Hajcak (2010) reported a bias among GAD compared to healthy controls, and this was only when 
threat stimuli were used as distractors and not as the target stimuli.  
As described earlier, only three studies used a non-clinical group of worriers as their 
population of interest. Of these studies, Engels et al. (2007) and Sass et al. (2010) found no 
attentional bias to threat among worriers compared to healthy controls. Oathes et al. (2011) also 
found no difference between worriers and healthy controls when images were used as the stimulus, 
but did find bias to threat among worriers compared to healthy controls when they used words as 
the experimental stimulus. MacLeod et al. (2007) also found a similar significant difference using 
words in their experiment comparing healthy controls with a sample of GAD participants who had 
been recruited through a self-report diagnostic questionnaire (and therefore lacks confirmation that 
the ‘GAD’ group were of clinical severity). 
One important factor to consider when examining bias among anxious populations 
compared to healthy controls is level of depression (Bar-Haim et al., 2007). Only nine studies actively 
controlled for depression in their design or through their analysis (Albu, 2008; Becker et al., 2001; 
Bradley et al., 1995, 1999; Engels et al., 2007; Martin et al., 1991, experiment 2; Mogg, Bradley, & 
Williams, 1995; Mogg et al., 2000; Sass et al., 2010). Of these nine studies, five (Albu, 2008; Bradley 
et al., 1995; Mogg, Bradley, & Williams, 1995; Rinck et al., 2003) reported significant bias to threat 
among GAD/worry compared to healthy controls, whilst Engels et al. (2007), Mogg et al. (2000) and 
Sass et al. (2010) failed to find a group difference between GAD/worry and healthy controls. There 
were sixteen studies that had reported group differences in depression (and one study without a 
measure of depression; MacLeod et al., 2007) and all reported a significant bias to threat among 
GAD/worry participants compared to healthy controls without controlling for these differences in 
depression.   
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Does this attentional bias to threat among GAD/worry groups differ from other clinical 
groups? 
GAD participants’ attentional bias was compared to other clinical populations of speech 
phobia patients, panic disorder patients, individuals with depression, and individuals with 
persecutory delusions. There were also comparisons with GAD groups and recovered GAD patients 
and those with trait anxiety. The results appear largely inconclusive, with seven studies finding a 
significant bias to threat in the GAD group compared to the comparison group, whilst six studies 
reported no group differences. Any overall conclusions must be qualified by different comparisons 
producing slightly different results. For example, Rinck et al. (2003) found a bias to threat to be 
specific to distractibility of GAD words (and not speech phobia-related words) and they also reported 
no attentional bias to any type of threat words among speech phobia patients. Becker et al. (2001) 
found this attentional bias among GAD patients to be general (biased to GAD-related words and 
speech phobia-related words equally), whilst speech phobia patients reported a specific bias to 
speech phobia-related words only (GAD and speech phobia groups did not differ in speech phobia-
related words’ latencies).  
One study found GAD participants to be significantly more biased to threat compared to 
panic disorder patients (Ashwin et al., 2012) but only when the threat was paired with neutral 
distractors, whilst the panic disorder patients reported a greater bias to threat than GAD patients 
when threat was paired with emotional (happy) distractors. Chen et al. (2013) found no difference 
between these two clinical populations overall (Chen et al., 2013), but they did report within-group 
analyses that showed that GAD participants were more biased to both GAD and panic-related words 
(compared to neutral and positive words), whilst the panic disorder patients only displayed a specific 
bias to panic disorder-related words (and not GAD-related words as well).  
Mogg et al. (1995) found GAD participants were not more biased in terms of attention to 
threat (anxiety-related or depression-related words) than depressed participants using behavioural 
reaction time data (although they did find that depressed patients were biased to anxious words 
only at supraliminal exposure durations compared to GAD participants). Mogg et al. (2000) also 
found no significant attentional biases in either GAD or depressed patients using behavioural data. In 
contrast, Mogg et al. (1993) found a greater bias to threat in GAD than depressed individuals using 
similar behavioural data and this bias was regardless of whether the stimuli were anxiety-related or 
depression-related words. Mogg et al. (2000) found a significant bias to threat among GAD 
participants when compared to depressed participants using eye movement data only, but this bias 
was specific to angry faces (threat) only and not sad faces as well. Bradley et al. (1995) sub-divided 
their sample of GAD participants into those with comorbid depression and those with GAD only and 
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found that the GAD only participants had a significant attentional bias to threat compared to those 
with comorbid depression, and this was specific to anxiety-related words and not depression-related 
words as well. 
Neither Mathews et al. (1990, task 2) nor Mogg et al (1992) found any significant difference 
between GAD participants and recovered GAD patients on current attentional bias to threat, with 
both studies also reporting that neither GAD nor recovered GAD groups found any difference in RTs 
for physical versus social threat. Freeman et al. (2000) reported that GAD participants were not 
significantly different to individuals with persecutory delusions on any attentional bias to direct, 
hidden, or potential threat. Finally, Engels et al. (2007) and Sass et al. (2010) both failed to find any 
bias to threat when comparing their trait worry group with a trait anxious group. 
 
Is attentional bias to threat among GAD/worry groups found across all experimental 
paradigms? 
Attentional bias to threat was found in the majority of experimental paradigms identified in 
this review. Eight out of the eleven studies (73%) using the attentional probe task found a bias to 
threat among GAD participants compared to healthy controls, with only Dibartolo et al. (1997), 
MacNamara and Hajcak (2010), and Mogg et al. (2000) failing to find a group difference. Of note, 
though, Mogg et al. (2000) found a bias among GAD participants compared to healthy controls when 
using eye movement data in their attentional probe task (rather than the behavioural reaction time 
data used by all the other studies adopting the attentional probe task). These eye movement data 
were also the only finding of a group difference between GAD and another clinical/anxious group 
using the attentional probe task (four other studies failed to find a group difference between GAD 
and either recovered GAD patients or depressed patients), suggesting that GAD were biased to 
threat compared to depressed patients.  
Twelve out of fourteen studies (86%) that used the affective Stroop task found GAD/worry 
participants to have attentional bias to threat compared to healthy controls. Only four studies failed 
to find a group difference with GAD/worry participants and healthy controls using the affective 
Stroop task. Four out of five studies using the affective Stroop task found a bias to threat among 
GAD compared to other clinical/anxious groups, with only Chen et al. (2013) failing to find a group 
difference (between GAD and panic disorder).  
Three out of four studies that used a visual search task found attentional bias to threat 
among GAD compared to healthy controls, and two out of three visual search studies found a bias to 
threat among GAD compared to other clinical populations (panic disorder and speech phobia). 
Neither the attentional blink task used by Olatunji et al. (2011), nor the spatial cueing tasks used by 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
28 
 
Yiend et al. (2014, experiment 2) found GAD participants to be more biased to threat compared to 
healthy controls. Yiend et al. (2014, experiment 1) also found no bias to threat among GAD 
participants compared with a matched non-clinical group of trait anxious individuals. Interestingly, 
Yiend et al. (2014, experiment 1) did find that within GAD participants only, there was speeded 
disengagement from threat, suggesting an opposite bias to that expected, implying that GAD 
participants were biased away from threat and thereby indicating possible attentional avoidance. 
Some of the lack of findings found in the above tasks may have been due to specific aspects 
of the methodological designs. These key aspects are reported below.    
 
Is attentional bias to threat among GAD/worry groups found at different stimuli exposure 
times? 
The studies reviewed here adopted a variety of stimulus exposures across various 
experimental tasks. Four studies directly compared subliminal exposures (14ms, masked) with 
supraliminal exposures (1000ms or until participant responded). All of these studies found no 
significant finding of exposure duration, indicating that attentional bias to threat that they found in 
GAD participants compared to healthy controls occurred regardless of subliminal or supraliminal 
conditions. This suggests that  bias may not always be determined solely by bottom-up or top-down 
processes, but by either one (although it cannot be ruled out that the biases seen in the longer SOAs 
were still due to persisting effects of bottom-up processes). However, other analysis carried out by 
Bradley et al. (1995) found that GAD participants were biased to threat compared to healthy 
controls only in the condition where the word stimuli were on screen until participants made a 
response, with no group difference occurring at the 14ms SOA condition. 
Yiend et al. (2014, experiment 2) also used two,  SOA conditions that included shorter SOAs, 
comparing 200ms vs 500ms and 300ms vs 700ms, and their study found no significant bias to threat 
among GAD compared to healthy controls, regardless of SOA condition. This may have been due to 
the method (spatial cueing task) or to the chosen stimuli (faces; see below). One significant finding 
reported in this particular study was that there was a general slowing of reaction times in response 
to fearful compared to neutral cues and this only occurred at 700ms and not 300ms. This general 
slowing though was not specific to GAD participants.  
Four other studies used SOAs of less than 500ms and as such could be regarded as testing 
more automatic attentional bias mediated by bottom-up processes. In these studies, only Ashwin et 
al. (2012) found a significant bias to threat among GAD participants compared to healthy controls, 
implying minimal evidence for bottom-up processes being involved in attentional bias among GAD 
individuals. However, the other three studies had all used images for their experimental stimuli and 
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this may have contributed to a lack of significant findings (see below) rather than the exposure 
durations.  
Studies in which SOAs were around 500ms, when both bottom-up and top-down processes 
may operate, all found GAD/worry participants biased to threat compared to healthy controls.  
Bradley et al. (1995) compared an SOA of 500ms with 1250ms and found the bias was present 
regardless of exposure condition. The other studies, in which stimuli were presented for 1000ms or 
longer produced, equivocal results. Two out of three findings for SOAs of 1000ms showed a 
significant bias to threat to threat among GAD participants compared to healthy controls, whilst 
among the six studies that stipulated a stimulus exposure of 1500ms or greater, only Oathes et al. 
(2011) found a significant bias to threat among their high worriers compared to non-worriers, and 
this was only for words and not images. Interestingly, in all studies in which stimuli were exposed 
until participants responded, or in the affective Stroop design where stimuli were permanently 
present until the participant finished reading all words, a significant bias to threat was found among 
GAD versus healthy controls. Once again, it is unclear whether extended exposure time is a potential 
factor that could be influencing the bias within GAD participants, or whether it was due to the fact 
that the overwhelming majority of these types of studies also used words as the type of stimulus, 
thus enhancing the chances of finding bias differences (see below).  
 
Is this attentional bias to threat among GAD/worry groups found with all types of stimuli?
   
Verbal-linguistic stimuli (words) vs. image-based stimuli (pictures/faces). 
All studies adopted visual stimuli; however, the form of these visual stimuli varied between 
words, faces, and pictures (e.g. of scenes), and these differences appear to have led to different 
results between studies. Of the eleven studies that found no attentional bias to threat among 
GAD/worry participants compared to healthy controls, eight of them had used either pictures of 
scenes or faces. Contrastingly, of the 25 studies that identified attentional bias to threat among 
GAD/worry groups compared with healthy controls, only four used faces and none had used 
pictures. Put another way, no study that used pictures as experimental stimuli found attentional bias 
to threat among GAD/worry compared to either healthy controls or any other clinical population 
(although only a comparison with individuals with persecutory delusions was made). Facial stimuli 
studies only found a group difference in attentional bias between GAD/worry participants and 
healthy controls in four out of seven studies. Further, one of these significant findings with facial 
stimuli found that GAD were biased away from threat (Yiend et al., 2014, experiment 1), which is in 
the opposite direction to that expected based on the other review findings. Contrastingly, of the 24 
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findings using word stimuli across several experimental paradigms, 21 found a significant attentional 
bias to threat among GAD/worry participants compared to healthy controls. Of the three studies 
that failed to produce a significant group finding, Engels et al. (2007) and Sass et al. (2010) had used 
a non-clinical trait worry group, whilst Dibartolo et al.’s (1997) threatening stimulus was the word 
“miss” and so was an atypical method for assessing attention to threat. Both of these factors may 
have contributed to a lack of finding in these three studies.  
In addition to comparison with healthy controls, experimental studies that used word stimuli 
also found that GAD participants were significantly biased to threat compared to depressed 
individuals, speech phobic individuals, and trait anxious individuals. Only Mogg et al. (vs depression; 
1995) and Chen et al. (vs panic; 2013) failed to find a difference between GAD and a different clinical 
population when using word stimuli. Interestingly, Mathews et al. (1990, task 2) and Mogg et al. 
(1992) found no difference between GAD and recovered GAD patients, suggesting that attentional 
bias to threatening word stimuli continues even after successful treatment for the anxiety disorder. 
 
Effects of emotional valence. 
Of the 20 studies that included another valence in their analyses (predominantly positive), 
only four found support for the general emotionality hypothesis. In other words, in these studies the 
GAD/worry participants were biased to both threat and positive stimuli equally (no significant 
difference between stimuli) compared to neutral stimuli in comparison with healthy controls 
(Ashwin et al., 2012; Becker et al., 2001; Bradley et al., 1999; Martin et al., 1991, experiment 4). 
Further, the Bradley et al. (1999) finding was only for the first half of the trials, after which a specific 
bias to threat (and not to positive as well) was found among GAD participants compared to healthy 
controls. Only Olatunji et al. (2011) compared threat with emotions other than positive/happy 
valence, namely examining disgust and erotic stimuli. They found no bias in their GAD participants 
compared to healthy controls across any stimuli valence. 
 
Type of threat.  
Finally, in terms of the specificity of the type of threat, seventeen studies conducted threat 
type analyses, comparing either physical threat with social threat (Martin et al., 1991, experiment 2, 
experiment 4; Mathews & MacLeod, 1985; Mathews et al., 1990, 1995; Mogg et al., 1992, 1989), 
potential, hidden and direct threat (Freeman et al., 2000), or GAD/anxiety-related stimuli with 
speech phobia-related stimuli (Becker et al., 2001; Rinck et al., 2003, experiment 1), with panic 
disorder stimuli (Chen et al., 2013), or with sad/depression-related stimuli (Bradley et al., 1999; 
Mogg, Bradley, Millar, et al., 1995b; Mogg et al., 1993, 2000; Mogg, Bradley, & Williams, 1995). No 
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study found evidence of a bias difference between physical and social threat. However, two 
additional studies sub-divided their GAD sample into those with primarily physical worries and those 
with primarily social worries and found that threat was specific to primary worry (Mogg et al., 1989), 
although this only occurred if participants reported their primary worry as being physical worries, 
with social worries being biased across all GAD participants (Mathews & MacLeod, 1985). In 
comparison with depression words, only Bradley et al. (1995) found a specific threat to anxiety 
words rather than depression words as well (although this was only at the supraliminal condition) 
and Mogg et al. (2000) found a specific bias of GAD rather than sad words (in eye movement data 
only), whilst all other studies found GAD words and depression words were equally biased among 
GAD participants when compared to healthy controls. Rinck et al. (2003, experiment 1) found there 
to be a specific bias to GAD-related threat rather than speech phobia-related stimuli as well, whilst 
Becker et al. (2001) found no difference in bias between GAD-related stimuli and speech phobia-
related stimuli, and Chen et al. (2013) found no difference between GAD-related and panic disorder-
related stimuli. Finally, Freeman et al. (2000) reported no bias to threat (regardless of type of 
threat). Overall, therefore, 11 out of 17 studies reported that the bias was of a general nature and 
not specific to GAD-related stimuli, whilst only three studies reported the bias to be specific to GAD-
related stimuli compared with other threat/anxiety disorder stimuli. 
  
Quality of Studies 
The quality assessment found that the majority of studies were of acceptable quality (n = 
24), with a further five studies being rated as ‘good quality’ (Becker et al., 2001; Blair et al., 2012; 
Bradley et al., 1995; Mogg et al., 1993, 2000). The ‘good quality’ studies were rated as such due to 
their attention to controlling for all of the key confounders of age, gender, IQ/verbal ability, and 
depression, as well as reporting a low level of risk of other potential biases (i.e., selection bias, 
information bias, performance bias, or attrition bias). A significant threat bias in GAD/worry 
participants compared to healthy controls was reported in four out of the five ‘good quality’ studies.  
Only four studies were categorised as ‘low quality’ (MacLeod et al., 2007; MacNamara & 
Hajcak, 2010; Mathews & MacLeod, 1985; Yiend et al., 2014, experiment 2), with two finding a 
significant bias to threat compared to healthy controls and two studies reporting no significant 
threat bias. The reasons for these studies being of ‘low quality’ were in part due to potential 
selection bias risk. MacLeod et al (2007) lacked any controlling of important confounding variables of 
age, gender, IQ, and depression. The same study also demonstrated an increased risk of information 
bias as the diagnosis of GAD to form group entry was done via an online self-report questionnaire, 
rather than a recognised clinical interview and thus it lacked suitable known validity and/or 
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reliability. McNamara and Hajcak’s (2010) study had also not controlled for the important factors of 
age and gender in their comparison of a worry group versus a control group and thus demonstrated 
potential selection bias risk, whilst Yiend et al. (2014, experiment 2) had not reported controlling for 
gender, IQ, or depression. Mathews and MacLeod’s (1985) study was categorised as ‘poor quality’ as 
minimal information was given about the diagnostic confirmation of the GAD group and the ‘control’ 
group were also reported to have a degree of overlap in terms of level of trait anxiety, therefore 
making results more difficult to interpret. 
 
Discussion 
 
The current systematic review examined the empirical evidence of attentional bias to threat 
in those with a diagnosis of GAD and high trait worriers (without GAD), compared to healthy controls 
and other clinical populations. The key conclusion is that there is evidence within the studies 
reviewed here to suggest that individuals with a clinical diagnosis of GAD show attentional bias 
favouring threatening information relative to non-clinical populations, as this evidence was found in 
over two-thirds of the studies included in the review. However, there was a relative paucity of 
studies that had investigated high worriers without GAD and it is recommended that more research 
should address this issue in such clinically-vulnerable individuals.  
The finding of attentional bias to threat among GAD patients fits with previous reviews that 
had suggested that such biases are common among anxious populations (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; 
Mogg & Bradley, 2005). The present review has updated these findings by systematically identifying 
this bias within the specific diagnosis of GAD. Other studies have also identified attentional bias to 
threat in non-clinical trait anxious individuals and it was hoped that this could be replicated in high 
trait worry. However, only three studies satisfied the inclusion criteria for the current review. Oathes 
et al. (2011) used high worriers and found attentional bias to threat compared to low worriers when 
using words as stimuli, but not when using pictures; whilst Engels et al. (2007) and Sass et al. (2010) 
did not find a selective attention to threat words in a high worry group compared to healthy 
controls. These conflicting results and the fact that there is evidence from only three studies 
highlights the need for further research of attentional biases in non-clinical but high trait worriers. 
Indeed, Ruscio (2002) highlight the various similarities and differences between GAD individuals and 
those with high levels of worry but without a GAD diagnosis. This line of enquiry is called for in 
general, but relevant to the current review is the recommendation for further research focusing 
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specifically on attentional bias to threat in high worriers and examining the relevant distinctions 
between them and clinical GAD populations. 
Though worriers may fear experiencing a range of different emotions, including positive 
ones (Turk, Heimberg, Luterek, Mennin, & Fresco, 2005), the overall evidence found in the studies 
reviewed here was that the attentional bias to threat among GAD participants was specific to 
negative threatening material compared to other types of valenced material, such as positive 
valence. These findings therefore support the view of there being a specific threat detection process 
(Beck et al., 1985) and/or evaluation system as outlined by such theoretical models as Mathews and 
Mackintosh’s (1998) selective processing in anxiety model and Williams et al.’s (1988) model. These 
early systems are designed to evaluate affective meaning and significance at an early stage of 
processing, focusing on ‘tagging’ threatening stimuli, rather than a general system that gets 
activated by any (i.e., including positive) emotionally arousing material and resulting in prioritised 
processing.    
In keeping with the diagnosis of GAD, where worry is evident across domains, attention bias 
in GAD tends to also be evident across a range of domains. This is in contrast to other anxiety 
disorders where fear content is confined to one domain that is specifically related to their disorder. 
For example, Becker et al. (2001) found that whilst their speech phobia sample was only biased to 
speech phobia-related words, their GAD sample was biased to both GAD-related words as well as 
speech phobia-related words. Likewise, Chen et al. (2013) found that GAD participants were biased 
to GAD and panic disorder-related stimuli, whilst the panic disorder patients only reported bias to 
panic disorder-related stimuli. It is important to examine the disorder-specificity of material as it is 
believed that the more specific the biases (i.e., social material for social anxiety disorder patients) 
the more causal effect the biases will have on the disorder (Yiend, 2010). However, in contrast, the 
collective findings here could suggest that worriers may be vulnerable to developing a range of 
anxiety disorders given their non-domain specific focus of attentional bias in this population. 
Importantly, though, as alluded to in the introduction, the association between attentional bias to 
threat and anxiety or worry is likely to be more complicated than a simple unidirectional cause and 
consequence relationship (Van Bockstaele et al., 2014). As such, further specific research needs to 
be conducted to examine the intricacies and temporal precedence of attentional bias to threat and 
worry.   
Attentional bias to threat found in this review was demonstrated across the major 
experimental paradigms and builds upon other research that has highlighted attentional biases to 
threatening stimuli among anxious individuals when using the affective Stroop task (e.g., Owens et 
al., 2004), the attentional probe task (e.g., Broadbent & Broadbent, 1988), and spatial cueing tasks 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
34 
 
(e.g., Fox et al., 2001; Yiend & Mathews, 2001). This review also demonstrated moderate evidence 
for attentional bias to threat using visual search paradigms (Ashwin et al., 2012; Rinck et al., 2003). 
Of more interest were the findings of some specific design variations used within the paradigms, 
which appeared to have more of an effect on attentional bias findings than the overall choice of 
paradigm itself. This was seen most clearly in studies which had used verbal-linguistic visual stimuli 
(i.e., words; e.g., Bradley et al., 1995) versus those studies which had used pictorial stimuli 
(i.e.,picures of scenes and faces; e.g., Blair et al., 2012).  
 
Verbal vs pictorial processing  
There was overwhelming evidence found in the current review that attentional bias to 
threat among GAD participants compared to healthy individuals is more likely to be observed when 
using words than when using picture stimuli. Among studies that used words as the stimuli, over 
75% of them found a significant bias effect in GAD/worry participants compared to other groups, 
whilst there was no evidence in the current review showing that GAD participants are more biased 
to threatening pictures than healthy controls.  There was only weak to moderate evidence that this 
comparative bias to threat exists for stimuli that were faces. This may fit with the wider literature on 
worry that demonstrates that mental-imagery (that includes a visual modality) is infrequent and 
brief during worry (Hirsch et al., 2012), supporting the idea that worry is a verbal rather than 
imagery-based process (Leigh & Hirsch, 2011; Stokes & Hirsch, 2010; Williams, Mathews, & Hirsch, 
2014). In fact, the very form of worry itself may further contribute to attentional bias to threat. For 
example, Williams and colleagues (2014) instructed their high worriers to worry either verbally (“to 
think in words, sentences and questions about the negative aspects of four scenarios”, p.10) or in 
mental-imagery (“consider a feared outcome…imagine yourself in a time- and location-specific 
manner, as though it were happening now”, p.10). They found that those who had worried in words 
and sentences had a significant bias to threat words in a subsequent attentional probe task, whilst 
those who had worried in mental-imagery did not. These experimental studies demonstrate the 
importance of the verbal-linguistic style of processing in worry on attentional bias to threat. This 
verbal-linguistic processing may also lead directly to negative thought intrusions in worriers. For 
example, Stokes and Hirsch (2010) trained a group of high worriers to worry in either verbal or 
mental-imagery format (using similar instructions to Williams et al.'s, (2014) study) and found that 
those who had worried in verbal format reported an increase in subsequent negative intrusions 
(contrastingly they also found that those who had engaged in mental-imagery based worry actually 
reported a decrease in negative intrusions). Overall, then, this prior research highlights the influence 
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of negative verbal-linguistic processing on attentional bias to threat and also in directly maintaining 
negative intrusions in worriers.  
It also therefore fits with the findings of the current review of attentional bias to threat 
effects among GAD/worry participants being more established using verbal-linguistic stimuli than 
pictorial stimuli.  A reason for the negative effects of verbal versus mental-imagery based worrying 
could be due to the former leading to a relatively greater reduction in working memory capacity, as 
was found by Leigh and Hirsch (2011) among their sample of worriers (but not low worriers), which 
may reduce attentional control resources (Klein & Boals, 2001). This fits with neural research into 
attentional bias among worriers. In particular, Engels and colleagues (2007) compared worriers’ 
(‘anxious apprehensive’ individuals) performance on an Affective Stroop task to ’anxious arousal’ 
individuals (high physiological anxiety, with limited worry) and healthy controls. Their findings 
highlighted that worriers reported significantly greater left hemisphere brain activity (around the 
language-processing centre of Broca’s area) in response to threatening stimuli compared to trait 
anxious individuals who reported greater right-hemisphere activity. They noted that “worry may 
affect attention and working memory by drawing on a limited pool of resources” (p. 360), leading to 
poorer performance on the task at hand (i.e. colour naming).   Thus, it would appear that continuous 
worry ‘rehearsal’ among trait worriers can lead to difficulty in focusing on, or redirecting attention 
to, non-worry based content. 
 
Engagement vs Disengagement 
The distinction between biased engagement and difficulty in disengagement has been a key 
focus of previous studies and reviews (Cisler et al., 2009; Cisler & Koster, 2010; Clarke et al., 2013) 
and this distinction, arguably, can be inferred by findings at different stimulus exposure durations. 
The current review found that GAD/worry participants showed biases to threat at both short 
duration exposure times suggestive of biased engagement to threat using subliminal processing 
(e.g., Mogg, Bradley, Millar, et al., 1995b), as well as in exposure durations of >1000ms (e.g., Oathes 
et al., 2011) indicative of delayed disengagement. Further, there was minimal evidence that 
GAD/worry participants were biased away from threat at medium to long exposure durations, 
thereby demonstrating little support for the vigilance-avoidance hypothesis of attentional bias to 
threat (Mogg & Bradley, 1998). Only one study found a bias away from threat, suggesting an 
avoidance of threat rather than of difficulty disengaging from threat (Yiend et al., 2014, experiment 
1) when the disengage mechanism is specifically assessed. Several other studies found no significant 
attentional biases to threat among GAD/worry participants using behavioural outcomes at 
supraliminal exposure durations (Dibartolo et al., 1997; Engels et al., 2007; Freeman et al., 2000; 
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Sass et al., 2010) (although it is important to note that biological outcomes can differ, for example 
Sass et al., 2010  found evidence of prioritization (N200 amplitude) of both pleasant and threat 
stimuli, at around 200ms exposure, that did not translate into reaction time effects). These null 
findings may have been due to greater individual differences in attentional control strategies and 
abilities. In other words, without controlling for such potential confounding variables as attentional 
control ability, null findings may occur as it has been shown that biases only occur in those with both 
high levels of trait anxiety and poor attentional control abilities (Derryberry & Reed, 2002). 
Therefore, this may be the case in GAD/worry participants as well, although this suggestion requires 
further research.    
Instead of the vigilance-avoidance hypothesis being true of GAD/worry participants, these 
current review findings could infer that GAD/worry participants are more likely to have difficulty 
disengaging from the threat as demonstrated by their biases to threat at more prolonged exposure 
durations (e.g., at 6000ms; Oathes et al., 2011) or when stimuli were present until a response was 
made (e.g., Mathews et al., 1995). However, Clarke et al. (2013) argued that the attentional probe 
task, similar to the Stroop task, is unable to fully disentangle the effects of biased engagement and 
difficulty in disengagement without first employing necessary design criteria proposed by them, 
which many of the current studies did not fulfil. Therefore, although it has been postulated that 
there is delayed disengagement from threat among worriers (Hirsch & Mathews, 2012), which is 
partly supported in the current papers reviewed here, it cannot be  concluded that the attentional 
bias to threat found among GAD/worry participants is a result of difficulty in disengagement from 
threatening stimuli, as highlighted by Yiend et al. (2014). Future research needs to use adapted 
experimental methodology as outlined by Clarke and colleagues in order to fully understand the role 
of this aspect of attentional bias. 
 
Bottom-Up vs Top-Down Processing 
One aspect of the current findings that may also require further investigation is the 
distinction between bottom-up and top-down processing of information. Several investigators have 
proposed that attentional processes involve initial bottom-up attentional capture, which is 
automatic and outside of awareness, as well as subsequent top-down attentional control, which is 
partly at a conscious level (Cisler & Koster, 2010). Blair and colleagues (2012) found that there was 
reduced top-down attentional control among individuals with GAD as a function of a reduced ability 
to recruit brain regions associated with this process, which was more impaired than among a 
comparative anxiety sample. This comparison between bottom-up and top-down processing can be 
approximately measured by examining findings at different stimulus exposure durations, with 
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shorter SOAs assumed to measure more stimulus-driven attentional capture (bottom-up; in 
particular if presented subliminally) and longer SOAs (presented ‘supraliminally’) assumed to allow 
for the recruitment and increased influence of strategic attentional control (top-down). The studies 
in the current review that investigated purely subliminal processes (via the use of masked stimuli) 
compared to supraliminal processes predominantly found a bias to threat in both conditions. 
Despite this strong support for the bias to threat in GAD participants occurring at either subliminal or 
supraliminal exposure conditions and thereby suggesting a role for either bottom-up and/or top-
down processes, one study failed to find a bias in their subliminal condition (Bradley et al., 1995). 
This finding implies that perhaps the bottom-up processes are not occurring in attentional bias to 
threat in individuals with GAD, which would fit with imaging research that has failed to find 
heightened amygdala sensitivity to threatening stimuli in adults with GAD (see Blair & Blair, 2012). In 
contrast however, there is evidence of extended amygdala activity in GAD (Paulesu et al 2010) 
during worry. Furthermore, cognitive models of anxiety propose an automatic threat detection 
mechanism at the early stages of the attentional process (e.g., Beck & Clark, 1997), which would 
indicate the activation of amygdala pathways. However, unlike the majority of the other subliminal 
(14ms, masked) studies, Bradley et al. (1995) had not controlled for concurrent depression in their 
GAD sample, and as such the lack of finding may have been due to a general slowing of response 
found among depressed individuals (White, Myerson, & Hale, 1997). 
Distinguishing between bottom-up and top-down processes in relation to attentional bias 
may be challenging. Furthermore, Bargh (1989) categorised ‘automatic’ processing into 
preconscious, post-conscious and goal-dependent automaticity, where the latter two although being 
automatic, still require a degree of conscious processing. When presenting stimuli supraliminally 
therefore, it is currently still unknown whether the mechanisms for any identified biases are due to a 
single stage of Bargh’s (1989) automaticity categorisation (or combination thereof). For example, 
Mogg and colleagues (Mogg, Bradley, & Williams, 1995) found a bias to threat subliminally but not 
so when stimuli were presented supraliminally and they concluded that the lack of significant 
findings supraliminally may be due to different processes occurring at different stages, and as such it 
makes interpretation difficult at these longer stimulus durations. Therefore, future work should look 
to examine the attention task performance under cognitive load (Cisler & Koster, 2010) and at a 
stimulus exposure duration sufficiently long enough to potentially involve all three of Bargh’s (1989) 
stages of automaticity. If biases disappear under this additional cognitive load, and does not differ 
across manipulations of automaticity then it could help establish the role of conscious controlled 
processes in attention allocation.   
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Limitations 
The current review had some limitations. First, the distinction between studies examining 
high/low worriers to the exclusion of high/low trait anxious populations may have led to many 
studies examining a bias to threat among individuals for whom worry is at a high level being 
excluded. However, this decision was taken to add more specificity to the research question and 
target the at-risk group of individuals whom suffer from the cognitive aspect of trait anxiety and not 
simply any person with high levels of trait anxiety (many of whom may or may not have high worry). 
Methodologically, the review may have been limited by there being only a single reviewer 
and as such may be susceptible to subjective selection bias. To combat this limitation, any 
uncertainty on inclusion/exclusion of articles was discussed with a second reviewer and a consensus 
reached. Nonetheless, the lack of a second reviewer involved in the initial screening and selection of 
papers may unduly influence the results. Second, the quality of the studies were also only rated by 
the primary author and lacked double-rating using a second reviewer. This limitation was partly 
mitigated against by the use of a standardised quality assessment tool and the use of objective 
criteria in determining quality. A third limitation was the decision to review only published articles. 
This may have led to a publication bias with unpublished studies being excluded even though they 
may have provided useful (albeit non-significant) findings. 
Finally, it was difficult to determine the exact processes underlying the findings in the 
majority of studies reviewed here, and thus limiting the strength of the conclusions being drawn. For 
example, the affective Stroop task was widely used in the reported studies but their findings are 
difficult to fully interpret, as it is difficult to establish whether this task assesses attentional bias or 
whether it is more accurately a measure of behavioural avoidance, and thus more closely aligned 
with attentional control, as De Ruiter and Brosschot (1994) found that both processes can contribute 
to differential findings among anxious individuals, but that it is the latter which appears to be more 
influential in affecting task performance. Further, when attentional bias has been identified by an 
empirical study using the affective Stroop task, it is invariably not clear whether the bias is due to 
engagement or disengagement difficulties. A recent study by Clarke, Hart, and MacLeod (2014) have 
attempted to understand the attentional mechanisms associated with the affective Stroop task and 
concluded that bias effects are in fact more likely to be due to enhanced attentional engagement 
with the threatening stimuli rather than delayed disengagement from it. However, in contrast, Cisler 
and Koster’s (2010) integrative review concluded that the attentional probe task more closely 
assessed a difficulty in disengaging from threat. Future research should look to further disentangle 
the components of attentional bias and its effects on anxiety symptoms, and in particular ensure 
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that the methodological paradigms are adapted to reliably measure the distinct components of 
engagement and disengagement (Clarke et al., 2013). 
 
Conclusions 
In conclusion, this review updated the evidence of attentional processing biases to 
threatening stimuli among people with a clinical diagnosis of GAD and individuals with high levels of 
trait worry. Although there was a dearth of studies investigating non-diagnosed high worriers, the 
majority of studies found a significant attentional bias to threat among both GAD and high worry 
groups compared to healthy controls or other clinical/anxious samples. This positive finding was 
established across different experimental paradigms and was most comprehensively seen in studies 
that employed verbal-linguistic stimuli (words) rather than stimuli in pictorial form. Despite the 
positive finding in the majority of studies, there were still a sufficient number of non-significant 
findings to suggest that specific components and mechanisms of the bias require further 
investigation. This greater understanding of the key factors involved in attentional bias to threat 
among worriers may help develop and refine the latest treatments for GAD patients, such as 
attentional bias modification approaches. 
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Highlights 
 Twenty-eight published articles were included in the final review 
 Strong evidence of a bias to threat among GAD patients compared to other 
groups 
 Few studies had investigated this bias in pathological trait worriers 
 GAD patients’ bias to threat evidenced strongest when threat material were 
words 
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Highlights  
 Twenty-nine published articles were included in the final review  
 Strong evidence of a bias to threat among people with GAD compared to other groups  
 Few studies had investigated this bias in high trait worriers  
 Bias to threat in people with GAD is strongest when threat material were words 
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